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Executive Summary 
 
Suicide attacks have become more prevalent globally, gaining in strategic importance. 
Most are religiously motivated, with Islamic Jihadi groups networked to permit “swarming” by 
different groups honing in on multiple targets, then dispersing to form new swarms. The 
incidence and impact of suicide terrorism have not diminished despite billions of dollars spent. 
Military and counterinsurgency actions are tactical, not strategic responses. Long-term reliance 
on belligerent tactics is counterproductive. Poverty and lack of education per se are not root 
causes of terrorism. Rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations – especially regarding 
civil liberties – are critical. There are recommendations to diminish the strategic threat. 
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“We in this country… don’t understand the Muslim fundamentalists today…. In 
any event, the fact is that at the senior levels of the Government we did not have a 
deep understanding of the peoples we were involved with [during the Vietnam 
War]; we didn’t know their history, their culture, their politics, their personalities. 
And that ignorance was reflected in the national intelligence estimates, which 
were the bible by which the Secretaries of State, Defense, National Security 
Advisers and the Presidents behaved.” 
 
- Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara, interviewed for The National 
Security Archive, Episode 11: Vietnam, 6 Dec. 
1998 
 
1. The Strategic Peril 
 
“It will be a long, hard slog.” That conclusion in a recent leaked memo by Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is official recognition of a grim and perverse reality: The war on 
terror is making the world an even more dangerous place. The past three years have seen more 
suicide attacks than the last quarter century. And while many top leaders of al-Qaeda are now in 
custody, the organization is transforming into a highly decentralized “virtual” network even 
more difficult to fight than before. 
According to a U.S. Congressional Report released in August 2003, suicide attacks from 
1980 through 2001 represented 3 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide but accounted for nearly 
half of all deaths. Since 2000, some 300 attacks have killed well over 5000 people in 17 
countries. At least 70% of these attacks were religiously motivated, with more than 100 attacks 
by Al-Qaeda and affiliates. More ominously, Islamic Jihadi groups are now networked in ways 
that permit “swarming” by actors contracted from many different groups homing in on multiple 
targets, then dispersing to form new swarms. Multiple coordinated suicide attack across countries 
and even continents is the adaptive hallmark of Al Qaeda's continued global web-making. The 
London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies surmises that: “The counter-terrorism 
effort has perversely impelled an already highly decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist 
network to become more ‘virtual’ and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize.”   2
 
Repeated suicide actions in Israel/Palestine, Pakistan/Kashmir/India, Russia/Chechnya, 
and now in U.S.-occupied Iraq show that massive counterforce alone does not stop, or even 
reliably diminish, frequency of suicide attack (although it may stem increase), and that suicide 
attacks often achieve attackers’ near-term strategic goals (forcing withdrawal from areas subject 
to attack, radically upsetting life routines in order to destabilize and demonstrate vulnerability). 
In Lebanon, Hizbollah (“Party of God”) initiated the first systematic campaign of contemporary 
suicide attack in 1983, killing hundreds of American and French soldiers in coordinated truck 
bombings, and compelling the Americans and French to withdraw their remaining forces. 
Hizbollah effectively ceased suicide operations after achieving its main objective of forcing 
Israel to abandon most of the territorial and political gains made during its 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon. In Palestine/Israel, suicide attack has derailed the Interim Agreement under the 1995 
Oslo accords, as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad persistently demanded, and thwarted peace 
negotiations aimed at territorial compromise. In Sri Lanka, Tamil Eelam (“Tamil Homeland”) 
only recently suspended actions by suicide squads of Tamil Tigers after wresting control of 
Tamil areas from the Sinhalese-dominated government, and forcing it to officially recognize 
some measure of Tamil autonomy. In Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda suicide bombings have provoked 
a drastically reduced U.S. military presence in the country. Economic disruption from the 9/11 
attacks on the U.S. range in official estimates from hundreds of billions of dollars to more than a 
trillion, with nearly $100 billion in costs for New York City alone.  
In every country where suicide attacks have occurred, people have become more 
suspicious and afraid of other people. Emboldened by such successful precedents, and by 
increasing support and recruitment among Muslim populations angered by U.S. actions in Iraq 
and those of its allies elsewhere, Jihadi groups believe and show themselves able to mount a 
lengthy and costly “war of attrition” against their foes. As Secretary Rumsfeld laments: "The 
cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions."  
The longer this war of attrition lasts, the greater the long-term strategic risk of 
radicalizing Muslim sentiment against us around the world, of undermining our own 
international alliances, and of causing serious and sustained discontent at home. In a June 2003 
survey, the Pew Research Center found that only 7% of Saudis had a positive view of the U.S.
 , 
and less than 20% of Pakistanis and Turks. 99% of Lebanese, 98% of Palestinians and 83% of   3
Indonesians held unfavorable opinions of the U.S., while majorities in these countries also 
expressed confidence in Osama Bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” A 
White House panel reported in October 2003 that Muslim hostility towards the USA “has 
reached shocking levels,” and is growing steadily. Similar shifts in opinion are occurring among 
our closest allies. In an October 2003 poll commissioned by the European Union, Europeans 
ranked America with North Korea as the greatest threat to world peace after Israel. A June 2003 
poll by the German Marshall Fund found that the majority of Europeans overall do not support 
force as a means of imposing international justice (compared with 84% of Americans who do 
support use of force), and no longer want the USA to maintain a strong global presence 
(compared to 64% in 2002 who favored a strong U.S. global role). Distrust becomes mutual. A 
survey released by Euro RSCG Worldwide in September 2003 shows that 73% of Americans 
admired France less than they did before 9/11; 57% had a diminished view of Saudi Arabia. Two 
years after the 9/11 attacks, most Americans felt no safer from terrorist threats, more distrustful 
of many longstanding allies, and increasingly anxious about the future.  
Just as with international and civil wars tracked over the last two centuries, political 
scientist Robert Axelrod shows that most casualties and cascading effects of terrorist acts are 
caused by a few, increasingly clustered and massive operations planned over months and years 
(and long-term planning is Al-Qaeda’s hallmark).
 This striking trend (a straight line on a log-log 
scale) makes imperative that effective countermeasures be found to avoid catastrophic 
devastation and disruption. “God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons,” proclaimed Fazlur 
Rahman Khalil of Harkat ul-Mujahideen on the CBS News show 60 Minutes II. A subsequent 
attack on India’s Parliament by Jaish-e-Muhammed, a Pakistani offshoot of the Al-Qaeda 
affiliate that Khalil heads, probably brought nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. The Pakistan government’s release of dozens of Harkat and Jaish operatives (who 
had been rounded up in a post-9/11 staging of solidarity with the U.S.) suggests such a 
“partnership in the war on terror” is more a matter of convenience than of the conviction 
necessary to stop those who are just dying to kill Americans, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Asian and 
African Christians, Animists and Muslim “unbelievers” (kafir). 
  One research priority should be to explore how best “netwar” may be waged against 
increasingly high-tech, networked terrorist groups that are seeking WMDs from multiple 
criminal and other non-state sources in order to pursue what physicist Richard Garwin terms   4
“megaterror.” Disabling and defending against relatively diffuse, horizontal social networks of 
control and command may require very different risk assessments and tactics than those used to 
combat the vertical social hierarchies that direct national armies. Carnegie Mellon’s Kathleen 
Carley has used multi-agent network analysis to monitor and model changes in Al-Qaeda, such 
as those following break up of the cell responsible for the suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy 
in Tanzania. She found that eliminating leaders who are central actors (having the most ties to 
other cell members and to other cells) can produce more adaptive responses in the overall 
network “healing” process than elimination of less central actors. This indicates that targeted 
assassinations – a favorite Israeli tactic – can be counterproductive, regardless of any civilian 
reaction. 
  A key weakness in increasingly virtual networks like Al-Qaeda is lessening of direct ties 
between family, friends and fighters, which makes trust in such networks harder to sustain and 
easier to sunder. But we have yet to take advantage of this emerging weakness in our foe. The 
U.S. remains (like Pakistan and other “partners”) too self-interested and hidebound by its own 
hard power to secure the trust and cooperation needed for the long slog. Traditional top-heavy 
and one-sided approaches - such as “strategic” bombardment, sanctions, invasion, occupation 
and other massive forms of coercion – will not eliminate tactically innovative and elusive 
terrorist swarms. Moreover, intelligence estimates and recommendations, which continue to be 
based primarily on models generalizing from past occurrences and frequency of events, actually 
make us less secure by underestimating the importance of large but rare attacks that are far and 
away the most damaging. Reliance on past events also blinds us to enemy innovation (the 
“Maginot Effect”). In finance, as George Soros has so profitably sensed, the more we look to the 
ripples, the less we are prepared for the tidal wave. This is also how we should face the 
apocalyptic warfare that Al-Qaeda and company intends. 
  Combating terrorist swarms probably requires our own military’s ability to operate in 
swarms of small and rapid mobile units, informed by culturally astute street intelligence and 
connected by wireless networks to powerful radar and satellite images. This sort of “network-
centric” warfare is in the planning at the new Pentagon Office of Force Transformation. But 
hunting down, catching and destroying terrorist networks also requires a new strategic form of 
“spider webbing” powered by multilateral, interfaith alliances of transnational, national and local 
groups. Bonded by mutual trust, purpose and dedication, these multi-channel associations (true   5
“coalitions of the willing” not bought or commandeered) could have the broad collective 
intelligence and resourcefulness needed to keep ahead of the game.  
  Equally important, if not more so, concerted effort must be made to understand under 
what conditions people opt to become committed terrorists in order to preempt and prevent 
terrorism. Of course, this doesn’t mean negotiating with terrorist groups over goals like Al-
Qaeda's quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states with a global caliphate. Bin 
Laden and other leaders of the Qaeda-led World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and 
Crusaders seek no compromise, and must probably be fought to the death. But most people who 
sympathize with him are likely open to give and take. We must circumscribe the point at which 
commitment becomes absolute and non-negotiable and seek to reach people before they come to 
it. 
The number of people outside of government who are trained and qualified to analyze 
terrorist organizations and the cultural support that sustains them is quite small in the United 
States, and meager elsewhere. Western academic institutions do not, as a rule, support terrorism 
studies as a discipline that merits long-term funding or intellectual dedication because of 
wariness over devoting resources to a politically-charged field whose relevance depends upon 
changing perceptions of threats and policy priorities. In an age of globalized information, there is 
potentially much more to be gained through freely accessed open sources than through classified 
sources (CIA and DIA analysts maintain that much of the information needed to “connect the 
points” before 9/11 was available from open sources). This situation of generally open-access to 
information facilitates joint civilian and military education programs and encourages long-term 
cooperative ventures between academic institutions, NGOs and government, akin to those 
established in order to manage the tensions and threats to national survival and global security 
during the Cold War. Reliance on government alone is too risky. 
 
2. Limitations of Military Action 
 
On May 1, 2003 President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq and “one victory 
in the war on terror that began on 9/11.” Cofer Black, the State Department’s Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, opined that while combat was ongoing Al-Qaeda had to “put up or shut up … 
they had failed. It proves the global war on terrorism is effective.” On May 12, Qaeda-directed   6
bombings of three Western compounds in Saudi Arabia, were soon followed by similar series of 
suicide attacks in Morocco, Israel and Chechnya. These attacks were collectively more numerous 
and widespread than in any of the preceding 12 months.  
Sizable suicide attacks in Israel, Indonesia and Iraq during August 2003 palpably altered 
the political landscape in the Middle East (end of the “Road Map”), southeast Asia (Indonesia’s 
government acknowledge it was “under assault”) and even within the U.S. (Republicans backed 
into political defense, Democrats charged on offense), and changed attitudes and relations among 
NATO countries and within the United Nations (Britain joined France and Germany to persuade 
the U.S. to seriously engage a jittery U.N.). In October 2003, Iraq suffered more suicide 
bombings than in its entire modern history (and now ranks only to Israel as the prime target of 
suicide bombings). White House claims that such attacks only confirm the increased 
“desperation” of terrorists in the face of allegedly increasing U.S. progress in the war on terror 
provide little real comfort. “Whatever their shape,” reported the New York Times, “Arab 
commentators were completely dismissive of President Bush’s remarks that the attacks were 
being inspired by growing American successes.” A November 2003 suicide attack on Italian 
forces in southern Iraq influenced other countries to forego any immediate contribution to the 
military occupation, and spurred the U.S. to speed up its timetable for ceding authority to Iraqis. 
In the same month, suicide bombings in Turkey by Al-Qaeda sympathizers directly challenged 
the strongest example of nonsectarian and democratic rule in the Muslim world, and extended 
the strategic threat to NATO’s underbelly. In December 2003, renewed suicide attacks by 
Chechnya’s “black widows” (women allowed to become religious martyrs, usually because of 
what Russian soldiers have done to the men in their families), brought terror to ordinary civilians 
in Russia’s own territory. 
The frequency and impact of suicide terrorism have not diminished despite 165 billion 
dollars requested so far for the war effort in Iraq, and despite tens of billions of dollars spent 
on countermeasures aimed at penetrating suicide-sponsoring organizations, killing and capturing 
terrorist operatives and leaders, and depriving recruits their training and support bases in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia, Philippines and elsewhere. If Iraq, 
whose previous regime had no tangible relation to 9/11, is now truly the “central front” in the 
fight against terrorism, as President Bush emphasizes,  it is at least partly because a vast military 
intervention by the U.S. has won there many new supporters for the terrorist’s cause. “War in   7
Iraq has probably inflamed radical passions among Muslims,” concludes the IISS, “and thus 
increased al Qaeda’s recruiting power and morale.” Al-Qaeda, which in the early 1990s first 
turned its hate from the Soviets to Saddam before taking on the U.S., had suffered manpower 
losses since 9/11, and so it profits doubly from no Saddam and new recruits.  
So, what  - apart from managing Iraq - is a good counterstrategy to terrorism, particularly 
of the suicidal 9/11 sort? Surely not belligerency alone. Military and counterinsurgency actions 
are tactical, not strategic responses to terrorism. Consider: 
According to the final U.S. Federal Interagency report on Combating Terrorism, State 
Department funding for counterstrategies to combat terrorism overseas increased 133% from 
9/11 through fiscal 2003. Including Defense Department budget increases and emergency 
supplemental measures, the bill for foreign operations in “The War on Terror” exceeded $200 
billion (with tens of  billions more for Homeland Security). Yet incidence of suicide terrorism 
has not declined. The report, which reviews plans and activities by dozens of civil and military 
agencies, reveals scant evidence of serious effort or funding to understand or prevent people 
becoming terrorists in the first place.  
Especially in the case of Al-Qaeda, which accounts for the most deaths by suicide attack 
worldwide (2000-2003), there are severe drawbacks to reliance on military and 
counterinsurgency action alone: 
 
•  The Al Qaeda network is a global association with affiliates in over 60 countries and 
links to recruits and supporters in nearly 100 countries. Massive military retaliation 
against an increasingly virtual network can be counterproductive if it is not clearly 
focused, with little likelihood of thoroughly neutralizing key actors and significant 
probability of causing appreciable civilian casualties, dislocation of civil life and hence 
increased hostility on the part of the general population. The war in Afghanistan targeted 
Taliban rule to destroy evident Taliban support for Al-Qaeda; however, war upon Iraq 
had no clear target or concrete result for the “War on Terror.”  Although the Iraq war was 
billed as necessary to deprive terrorists – especially Al Qaeda – of WMDs, there were no 
reliable data to support President Bush’s claim that Iraqi WMDs posed “a mounting 
threat to our country,” much less that Al-Qaeda had plans to access them.
  (In late 
November 2003, veteran CIA analyst Stuart Cohen, who was in charge of putting   8
together the 2002 intelligence estimate, posted this partial disclaimer on the agency’s 
website: “Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the 
Key Judgments to know that as we said: ‘We lacked specific information of Iraq’s WMD 
program’.”) 
 
•  The aftermath of large-scale military action requires rapid, large-scale and sustained post-
combat restructuring of society. This puts a considerable economic and political burden 
on the occupying powers, which their homeland populations may be unwilling to support 
in the measure necessary. Thus, for the second time in little more than a decade, the U.S. 
has practically forsaken Afghanistan after declaring military victory there. The country 
receives relatively paltry aid, despite overwhelming evidence of utter devastation and 
promises to alleviate the population’s misery. Rural regions remain on the edge of 
political, social and economic meltdown. Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s pro-American 
President, barely rules Kabul. The country is again the world’s major exporter of opium 
poppy. 
 
•  An occupying military administration alone is unlikely to have the policing, economic 
and social welfare capabilities needed for the job of reconstruction. Performance 
assessments of peacekeeping activity by U.S. forces in Bosnia indicate that soldiers on 
standard tours of duty tend to be reactive and risk averse in dealing with local problems. 
They venture from their barracks only in fully-outfitted patrols and convoys. The focus is 
on efficiency in completing short-term assignments, not on deepening understanding of 
local society. Soldiers want to stay alive, finish their tour and go home. Unfamiliar with 
the culture, and unwilling to risk becoming familiar, they often overreact to low-level 
threats (taking a pile of leftover building stones for an ambush) and ignore problems that 
do not seem immediately threatening (leaving blocked village sewage untended, which 
leads to disease, then spurs rioting). In Iraq, the high level of ongoing threats exacerbates 
such behaviors and their consequences. According to Larry Hollingworth, a former 
British colonel and relief specialist who has worked in the Balkans and Chechnya served 
with Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance after the fall of 
Baghdad: “at the U.S. military’s insistence, we traveled out from our fortified   9
headquarters in Saddam’s old Republican Guard Palace in armored vehicles, wearing 
helmets and flack jackets, trying to convince Iraqis that peace was at hand, and that they 
were safe. It was ridiculous.” Delays caused in seeking competent outsiders and locals 
adequate to the task prolong conditions of political instability and personal insecurity in 
which terrorism thrives. This is arguably the case today in Iraq,
 as it was in Israeli-
occupied Lebanon 20 years ago. 
 
•  A continued war footing causes psychological and social strain on the homeland and, in 
the absence of clear prospects for military victory, may undermine political faith and 
economic performance, no matter how positive the public relations “spin.”  
 
Regarding the Palestine/Israel conflict, which accounts for a plurality of suicide attacks 
worldwide, polls by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre indicate that increased 
coercive measures by Israeli forces during the Second Intifada (fall 2000 - present) are positively 
correlated with Palestinian popular support for attacks. Support for suicide attacks, in turn, 
directly correlates with:  
 
•  increased support for the principal radical Islamic groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, 
 




•  decreased optimism for the future, and decreased Palestinian readiness to follow the 
peace process toward a negotiated political solution. 
 
Accordingly, a significant part of future efforts should focus on identifying root causes 
and how to effectively deal with them, within a reasonable time frame. This effort may demand 
more patience than governments can politically tolerate in times of crisis; however, we can ill 
afford to ignore either the consequences of own society’s actions or the causes behind the actions 
of others.   10
3. Misconceiving Root Causes 
 
The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights “The War of Ideas” and 
“The War on Poverty” as adjunct programs to reduce terrorism’s pool of support and 
recruitment. The war of ideas is based on the premise that terrorists and their supporters “hate 
our freedoms,” a sentiment President Bush has expressed both with regard to Al-Qaeda and to 
the Iraqi resistance. But survey data reliably show that most Muslims who support suicide 
terrorism favor elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity and economic 
choice. Mark Tessler, who coordinates long-term surveys of Muslim societies from the 
University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, finds that Arab attitudes to American 
culture are most favorable among young adults, regardless of their religious feeling. This is the 
same population that terrorist recruiters single out. 
The war on poverty is based on the premise that terrorism is spawned by conditions of 
impoverishment, lack of education and social estrangement. Current models of crime prevention 
are based on the assumption that the greater the amount of human capital accumulated by a 
person (including income and education), the less likely that person is to commit a crime. This is 
because the greater a person’s human capital, the more that person is aware of losing out on 
substantial future gains if captured or killed (“opportunity costs”). Similar thinking applies to 
suicide: the less promising one’s future, the more likely one’s choice to end life. Almost all 
current U.S. foreign aid programs related to terrorism pivot on such assumptions. Money is 
poured into poverty reduction and literacy enhancement so that rising opportunity costs will act 
to deter terrorism. According to the U.S. State Department report, September 11 One Year Later, 
development aid is based “on the belief that poverty provides a breeding ground for terrorism. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed this conviction.” President Bush declared at last 
year's UN conference in Monterrey, Mexico: "We fight against poverty because hope is an 
answer to terror." But study after study demonstrates that suicide terrorists and their supporters 
are not abjectly poor, illiterate or socially estranged.  If they were, they couldn’t produce 
effective and reliable killers, argues retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Todd Stewart, Ohio State’s 
Director for International and Homeland Security.  
Another misconception that implicitly drives current national security policy is that 
suicide terrorists are not sane. Senator John Warner testified that a new security doctrine of   11
preemption was necessary because “those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free 
world are not rational.” But suicide terrorists on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology. 
A report on The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism used by the Central and Defense 
Intelligence Agencies (CIA and DIA) finds that “there is no psychological attribute or 
personality distinctive of terrorists.” 
  Recruits are generally well-adjusted in their families and liked by peers, and often more 
educated and economically better off than their surrounding population. Researchers Basel Saleh 
and Claude Berrebi independently find that the majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have 
college education (versus 15% of the population of comparable age) and that less than 15% come 
from poor families (although about a third of the population lives in poverty). DIA sources who 
have interrogated Al-Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo note that Saudi-born operatives, especially 
those in leadership positions, are often “educated above reasonable employment level, a 
surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families.” Motivation and 
commitment are evident in willingness to sacrifice material and emotional comforts (families, 
jobs, physical security), and to pay their own way from their homes to travel long distances. The 
general pattern was captured in a Singapore Parliamentary report on prisoners from Jemaah 
Islamiyah, an Al-Qaeda ally: "These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised. Like 
many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held normal, 
respectable jobs. Most detainees regarded religion as their most important personal value."   
This is not to deny the role of economic factors in sustaining popular support for 
terrorism, such as those that arise from explosive population growth, combined with failure of 
rigidly authoritarian governments to provide initiatives for youth. It is difficult, and perhaps not 
possible, to disentangle the relative significance of political versus economic factors in the in the 
Muslim world’s terror-generating process of rising aspirations followed by dwindling 
expectations. During the 1990s, rising aspirations among Muslim peoples were fanned by 
momentous political developments in Algeria (multiparty elections, including Islamic groups), 
Palestine (Oslo Peace Accords), Chechnya (dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of 
Communist control), Indonesia (Suharto’s resignation and the end of dictatorship) and 
elsewhere. In each case, economic stagnation or decline followed as political aspirations were 
thwarted (cancellation of elections by the Algerian Army, breakdown of the Israel-Palestine   12
Camp David negotiations, Russia’s crackdown on Chechnya’s bid for autonomy, fomenting of 
interethnic strife and political disaccord by Suharto army loyalists and paramilitary groups). 
Support and recruitment for suicide terrorism occur not under conditions of political 
repression, poverty and unemployment or illiteracy as such, but when converging political, 
economic and social trends produce diminishing life opportunities relative to expectations, thus 
generating frustrations that radical organizations exploit. In fact, the greater a person's human 
capital (including income and education), the greater that person's awareness of future needs, and 
the greater the person's degree of altruism and commitment to the future generation's welfare. 
This is the economic rationale for the emergence of dynastic families, and also anchors devotion 
to social causes that require understanding the future (e.g., conservation movements).
 
Revolutionary terror bursts upon history when greater freedom from want and awareness of the 
future are amplified into explosive frustration by corrupt and corroded societies that choke rising 
aspirations.  
This helps to account for terrorism’s spread but not its spark. Most people in the world 
who suffer stifling, even murderous oppression don’t become terrorists. As with nearly all 
creators and leaders of history’s terrorist movements, those who conceive of using suicide 
terrorism in the first place belong mostly to an intellectual elite possessing sufficient material 
means for personal advancement. What motivates them is religious or ideological conviction and 
zeal, whose founding assumptions (like those of any religion) cannot be rationally scrutinized, 
and which they get others to believe in and die for.
  
  This doesn’t mean that sponsors of martyrdom are irrational. Use of religious 
assumptions for political or economic purposes can be eminently rational, as in martyrdom or 
missionary actions to gain recognition, recruits and power. Dwindling returns on future life 
prospects for individuals translate into increasing recruitment and prompt returns for terrorist 
groups and leaders. This degree of manipulation usually works, however, only if the 
manipulators themselves are convinced of what they are doing.  
Through indoctrination of recruits into relatively small and closeted cells - emotionally 
tight-knit "brotherhoods" - terror organizations create a "family" of cell mates who are just as 
willing to sacrifice for one another as a mother for her children. Consider the “Oath to Jihad” 
taken by recruits to Harkat ul-Mujahideen, which affirms that by their sacrifice they would help 
secure the future of their family of fictive kin: “Each [martyr] has a special place – among them   13
are brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear.”
 These culturally-contrived cell 
loyalties mimic and (at least temporarily) override genetically-based fidelities to family kin while 
securing belief in sacrifice to a larger group cause. The mechanism of manipulation resembles 
the one used by our own army to train soldiers in small groups of committed buddies who 
acquire willingness to sacrifice for one another, and derivatively for glory and country 
(motherland, fatherland).  
Like the best commercial advertisers, but to ghastlier effect, charismatic leaders of 
terrorist groups turn ordinary desires for family and religion into cravings for what they're 
pitching, to the benefit of the manipulating organization rather than the individual being 
manipulated (much as the fast food or soft drink industries manipulate innate desires for 
naturally scarce commodities like fatty foods and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitness but 
benefit the manipulating institution). This suggests that a key to understanding and parrying 
suicide terrorism is to concentrate more on the organizational structure, indoctrination methods 
and ideological appeal of recruiting organizations than on personality attributes. No doubt 
predisposing individual differences render some people more susceptible to social factors that 
leaders use to get people to die for their cause. But months – sometimes years – of intense 
indoctrination can lead to “blind obedience” no matter who the individual, as indicated in studies 
of people who become torturers for their governments. 
  Despite numerous studies of individual behavior in group contexts that show situation to 
be a much better predictor than personality, Americans overwhelmingly believe that personal 
decision, success and failure depend upon individual choice, responsibility and personality. Most 
of the world disagrees. This is plausibly one reason many Americans tend to think of terrorists as 
“homicidal maniacs.” “If we have to, we just mow the whole place down,” said Senator Trent 
Lott, exasperated with the situation in Iraq, “You’re dealing with insane suicide bombers who are 
killing our people, and we need to be very aggressive in taking them out.” Although we can't do 
much about personality traits, whether biologically influenced or not, we presumably can think 
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4. Facing Our Responsibilities 
 
Whether because of a fundamental attribution error that assigns the individual all 
responsibility for any action, or willful blindness to avoid dissonance with one’s own worldview, 
Americans often view attempts to understand what motivates terrorism as a waste of time or 
worse, as pandering to terrorism. But countering terrorism also requires facing problems with our 
own society’s appraisals and actions. 
There is no evidence these people hate our internal cultural freedoms, but every 
indication they dislike its external foreign policies, particularly in the Middle East. They are not 
so much jealous of America as hostile to a perceived jumble of realpolitik and messianic mission 
that allows preemptive action against those who oppose the vision in the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of a “single sustainable model for national success… right and true 
for every person, in every society.” A Defense Department Science Board reports (in response to 
a suicide attack against U.S. military housing at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia
 ): "Historical data 
show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in 
terrorist attacks against the United States.”  
The U.S. has a military presence in over 100 countries, most of which are not 
democracies. Backing weak, failed and corrupt states generates animosity and terrorism by 
peoples who wish to participate in strong, successful and honest governance. Studies by 
Princeton economist Alan Krueger and others find no correlation between a nation’s per capita 
income and terrorism, but do find a correlation between lack of civil liberties (defined by 
Freedom House) and terrorism. A recent National Research Council report, Discouraging 
Terrorism, finds that: “terrorism and its supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies of 
extreme political repression and discouraged by policies of incorporating both dissident and 
moderate groups responsibly into civil society and the political process.” 
What can we do to diminish the strategic threat and attract potential recruits away from 
terrorism? We should play on the strengths of our “soft power” to inspire individual creativity 
and the collective benefits of free choice, not rely primarily on the “hard power” of conflict and 
coercion. Muslim and world opinion generally favors these aspects of our soft power.   
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•  We should promote personal liberty by withdrawing military and political support from 
those of our “partners” who persistently infringe on human rights and deny political 
expression to their people.
 There seems to be a direct correlation between U.S. military 
aid to politically corroded or ethnically divided states, human rights abuses by those 
regimes, and rise in terrorism, as initially moderate opposition is pushed into common 
cause with more radical elements. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
regularly document “horrific” and “massive” humans rights abuses occurring in countries 
that receive the most U.S. aid in absolute terms (Israel, Egypt, Colombia, Pakistan), and 
the greatest relative increase in aid (Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Turkey) including 
many “new Partners in the War on Terrorism.” Of course, we can’t just unilaterally pull 
out of places that would then be threatened with collapse or hostile takeover. But our 
long-term planning must not allow us to become embroiled in maintaining brutal and 
repressive regimes whose practices generate popular resentment against us. The 
geopolitical context no longer supports complacent tolerance for “bastards, but our 
bastards.” In the Cold War’s zero-sum game, when we backed a nation our opponent lost; 
now, if we sponsor regimes devoid of popular support, non-state and transnational 
terrorism only gains. 
 
•  We should promote economic choice. But people must be allowed to pick and chose 
those goods and values of ours that they desire, and must not be made to accept goods 
and values that we want them to have in the name of “free markets” or “globalization.” 
The forced privatization of the formerly state-run economy of Iraq, without the informed 
consent of Iraqi citizens, has little to do with promoting freedom (and is certainly illegal 
under the terms of the Hague Convention). Similarly, the U.S. decision to exclude allies 
in NATO and the U.N. Security Council from bidding in fair competition for contracts to 
rebuild Iraq because they did not support the war suggests that a chief aim of 
globalization may be simply “Americanization” by politically correct multinationals. 
 
•  We should promote democracy. But we must be ready to accept “democracy’s paradox”:  
if people choose representatives who we don’t like, or who have different values or ways 
of doing things, then we must accept voters’ decisions as long as this does not yield   16
physical violence against us. In fact, democratic governments, whose electoral mandates 
can only be achieved and maintained through compromise and popular consensus, have 
never warred against each other (although U.S. subversion of the elected governments of 
Iran’s Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, Guatemala President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and 
Chile President Salvador Allende in 1973 came close). So let us pressure those in power 
to accept the verdict of the ballot box, whether or not they (or we) like the results. 
Democratic self-determination in Palestine, Kashmir and Iraq – or for that matter, 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia – will more likely reduce terrorism than more 
military and counterinsurgency aid. 
 
•  We should promote educational opportunity by funding non-sectarian education as an 
alternative to religious seminaries (madrassahs) that have become principal sources of 
free education (including books, housing, board) unto Holy War for many Muslim youth. 
We can help to train teachers and administrators, build schools and dormitories, furnish 
books and computers, provide fellowships and stipends, and fund local invitations for all 
willing parties to discuss and debate.  Radical Islamic and other terrorist groups often 
provide more and better educational, medical, and social welfare services than 
governments do; so we must help others in these societies to compete with – rather than 
attempt to crush – such programs for the bodies, minds and hearts of people. 
 
•  We must establish an intense dialogue with Muslim religious and community leaders to 
reconcile Islamic custom and religious law (shari’a) with internationally recognized 
standards for crime and punishment and human rights. 
 
•  We should empower moderates from within to confront inadequacies and inconsistencies 
in their own knowledge (of others as evil), values (respect for life) and behavior (support 
for killing), and other members of their group. This can produce emotional dissatisfaction 
leading to lasting change and influence in these individuals. Social psychology research 
by Stanford’s Lee Ross and others indicates that people who identify with antagonistic 
groups use conflicting information from the other group to reinforce antagonism.  Thus, 
simply trying to persuade others from without by bombarding them with more self-  17
serving information about how good we are may only increase hostility. Nevertheless, 
most people have more moderate views than what they consider their group norm to be, 
and so may be more willing to listen to others, to negotiate and to feed back compromise 
to their own group if allowed to engage others outside of group contexts.  
 
•  We must work in concert with the international community to address the historical and 
personal grievances – whether perceived or actual - of people who have been denied the 
opportunity and power to realize their hopes and aspirations for personal security, 
collective peace, environmental sustainability and cultural fulfillment. For, no evidence 
(historical or otherwise) indicates that support for suicide terrorism will evaporate 
without complicity in achieving at least some fundamental goals that suicide attackers 
and supporting communities share. The festering conflicts and killing fields of 
Israel/Palestine, Pakistan/Kashmir/India, Russia/Chechnya, the Western Sahara, 
Mindanao, The Moluccas, Bosnia and elsewhere should be as much of a concern and a 
prod to action as the current state of the world economy.  
 
What can we do to demonstrate good will, shore up domestic support and gain 
international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism? We must realize that: 
 
•  Candor and debate with open dissent instill confidence, but propaganda and manipulative 
public relations breed disaffection and distrust within our own society, alienate our allies 
and incite support for our foes. As any good scientist or businessman knows, by 
acknowledging errors, we can correct them to perform better, and in performing better we 
are better able to recognize and correct our errors. Our government does not inspire trust 
with rosy White House releases about how “the good days outnumber the bad days” (just 
after 5 suicide bombs in Baghdad’s bloodiest day to that date) or feel-good State 
Department infomercials about the “Afghan Spring” (when Afghanistan remains second 
only to the Congo as the planet’s deadliest region of armed conflict). We know now that 
claims for going to war, such as Iraq’s possession of WMDs and links to Al Qaeda, were 
based on faulty or false inferences from flimsy and fragmentary evidence. Rather than 
own up to this as either error in judgment or cover for something else important,   18
continued spinning and dodging risk destroying the national consensus and conviction 
necessary for difficult and informed decisions, and undermining the reliability of our case 
for international cooperation to improve the security climate. 
 
•  People from different cultures do not recognize the legitimacy of another’s motives or 
“ideals” as justifying the consequences of actions. From the perspective of different 
cultures, regard for consequences always trumps regard for motives. It does no good to 
attempt to persuade others that their people’s deaths and suffering at our hands are 
“accidental,” “regrettable and unwanted” or “collateral” to our “real” intentions and 
goals. Such interpretations only have moral import and political persuasion for those who 
already share a society’s moral axioms and political ideals. No amount of spin will 
convince most Muslims that the 4,000 or so civilian deaths suffered during Iraq’s combat 
phase were any less atrocious in destruction of innocent life than the 3,000 deaths of 
9/11.  We ignore this at the risk of appearing to be brutal hypocrites. 
 
•  Similarly, we do not gain the world’s trust by “exceptional” treatment of prisoners seized 
in combat (interning them without charge at Guantánamo or handing them over to others 
who are not bound by our legal constraints), by insisting that only our WMDs and those 
of allies and clients are for good purposes, and by demanding that others abide by 
international treaties and UN resolutions of our choosing as we ignore those that 
displease us.  
 
  In sum, shows of military strength don't seem to dissuade popular support for terrorism: 
witness failure in Israel's and Russia’s coercive efforts to end the string of Palestinian and 
Chechnyan suicide bombings. Rather, we need to show the Muslim world the side of democratic 
cultures they most respect. Our engagement needs to involve interfaith initiatives, not ethnic 
profiling. We should promote international trust through negotiation and proliferation of 
international norms and standards, whether or not a particular application proves to our liking. 
We must address grievances in places where daily reports and images of violence against 
civilians engender global Muslim resentment. And we have to stop insisting that our vision alone 
defines the future of civilization for all humanity. A key “lesson” of the Vietnam War, former   19
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told Harvard’s Kennedy School in 1995, was to err in 
thinking “we're on a mission. We weren't then and we aren't today. And we shouldn't act 
unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. We don't have the God-given right to shape 
every nation to our own image.” America may be the world’s “indispensable nation,” as 




Ever since the Enlightenment, the major movements of the modern world – all the big 
“isms” of recent history - have been on a mission to invent “humanity” by saving it and making 
it their own. Modernism is the industrial legacy of monotheism (however atheist in appearance), 
secularized and scientifically applied. No non-monotheistic society ever considered that all 
people are, or should be, essentially of a kind. To many in our own society, the 20th-century 
demise of anarchism, facism and communism left history’s playing field wide open to what 
Lincoln besought as “the last great hope of mankind,” our society’s ideal of democratic 
liberalism. Even after 9/11, there is scant recognition that the unforseen events of history 
perpetually transform or destroy the best laid plans for historical engineering. Yet the 
catastrophic wars and revolutions of the modern era teach us that the more uncompromising the 
design and the more self-assured the designer, the harder both will fall. 
If we take an evolutionary perspective on history, which frames success and failure in 
terms of the growth or decline of traits over populations (and, eventually, in terms of the growth 
or decline of populations themselves), then current U.S. antiterrorism policies do not seem 
adaptive. Support for the U.S. is declining in the world as support for terrorism increases. 
Moreover, U.S. procedures to combat terror are often predictable and reactive. Even the “new” 
security strategy of preemption is preponderantly about maintaining U.S. preponderance (the 
global status quo) using traditional military means and other Great Power tactics. By contrast, 
terrorist stratagems are increasingly innovative and proactive. Perhaps more important, 
increasingly many people in the world perceive the terrorists’ anti-American agenda to be 
turning the tide of history. Such perceptions invariably act upon the future in unpredictable ways 
that make it folly and hazardous to believe in the constancy of clashing civilizations, the 
inevitability of the world’s Americanization (“globalization” for some), or the end of history.   20
Whatever the final outcome, the more fixed that religious fundamentalisms become in 
their own messianic mission to “desecularize” modernity, the more likely they, too, will 
miserably fail. To survive, we must learn to ride history’s tide, looking for destinations fit to our 
means and likings. But we must be forever vigilant in adapting our course to changing 
circumstances, or else they will cause us to drown. 
 
 